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Abstract
We introduce the logic ITLe, an intuitionistic temporal logic based on
structures (W,4, S), where 4 is used to interpret intuitionistic implication
and S is a 4-monotone function used to interpret temporal modalities.
Our main result is that the satisfiability and validity problems for ITLe
are decidable. We prove this by showing that the logic enjoys the strong
finite model property. In contrast, we also consider a ‘persistent’ version
of the logic, ITLp, whose models are similar to Cartesian products. We
prove that, unlike ITLe, ITLp does not have the finite model property.
1 Introduction
Intuitionistic logic [6, 22] and its modal extensions [9, 27, 28] play a crucial role
in the area of computer science and artificial intelligence. For instance, Pearce’s
Equilibrium Logic [26], which characterises the Answer Set semantics [21, 23]
of logic programs (ASP), is defined in terms of the intermediate logic of Here
and There [15], together with a minimisation criterion. Extensions of Here
and There logic allowed the ASP paradigm, already used in a wide range of
domains [1, 3, 14, 16, 25], to be applied to reasoning about temporal or epistemic
scenarios [5, 10] while satisfying the theorem of strong equivalence [4, 20, 10],
central to logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning.
Such modal extensions of Here and There logic are simple cases of a modal
intuitionistic logic; in general, the study of such logics can be a challenging
enterprise [28]. In particular, there is a huge gap that must be filled regarding
combinations of intuitionistic and linear time temporal logic. Nevertheless, there
have been several efforts in this direction, including logics with ‘past’ and ‘future’
tenses [9] or with ‘next’ , ’eventually’ ♦ and/or ‘henceforth’  modalities. The
main contributions to the field include the following:
• Davies’ intuitionistic temporal logic with [7] was provided Kripke se-
mantics and a complete deductive system by Kojima and Igarashi [18].
1
• Logics with , were axiomatized by Kamide and Wansing [17], where 
was interpreted over bounded time.
• Nishimura [24] provided a sound and complete axiomatization for an in-
tuitionistic variant of the propositional dynamic logic PDL.
• Balbiani and Die´guez [2] axiomatized the Here and There variant of LTL
with ,♦,.
• Davoren [8] introduced topological semantics for temporal logics and Ferna´n-
dez-Duque [11] proved the decidability of a logic with ,♦ and a universal
modality based on topological semantics.
With the exception of [8, 11], semantics for intuitionistic LTL use frames of
the form (W,4, S), where 4 is a partial order used to interpret the intuitionistic
implication and S is a binary relation used to interpret temporal operators.
Since we are interested in linear time, we will restrict our attention to the case
where S is a function. Thus, for example, p is true on some world w ∈ W
whenever p is true on S(w). Note, however, that S cannot be an arbitrary
function. Intuitionistic semantics have the feature that, for any formula ϕ and
worlds w 4 v ∈W , if ϕ is true on w then it must also be true of v; that is, truth
is monotone. If we want this property to be preserved by formulas involving ,
we need for 4 and S to satisfy certain confluence properties. In the literature,
one generally considers frames satisfying 1. w 4 v implies S(w) 4 S(v) (forward
confluence, or simply confluence), and 2. if u < S(w), there is v < w such that
S(v) = u (backward confluence). We will call frames satisfying these conditions
persistent frames (see Sec. 3), mainly due to the fact that they are closely related
to (persistent) products of modal logics [12]. Persistent frames for intuitionistic
LTL are the frames of the modal logic S4×LTL, which is non-axiomatizable. For
this reason, it may not be surprising that it is unknown whether the intuitionistic
temporal logic of persistent frames, which we denote ITLp, is decidable.
However, as we will see in Proposition 1, only forward confluence is needed
for truth of all formulas to be monotone, even in the presence of ♦ and . The
frames satisfying this condition are, instead, related to expanding products of
modal logics [13], which are often decidable even when the corresponding prod-
uct is non-axiomatizable. This suggests that dropping the backwards confluence
could also lead to a more manageable intuitionistic temporal logic. This logic,
which we denote ITLe, is the focus of the present paper and, as we will prove in
this paper, it enjoys a crucial advantage over ITLp: ITLe has the strong finite
model property (hence, it is decidable), but ITLp does not. In fact, to the best
of our knowledge, ITLe is the first known decidable intuitionistic temporal logic
that 1. is conservative over propositional intuitionistic logic, 2. includes (or can
define) the three modalities ,♦,, and 3. is interpreted over infinite time.
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2 Syntax and semantics
We will work in the language L of LTL given by the following grammar:
ϕ, ψ := p | ⊥ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ϕ | ♦ϕ | ϕ,
where p is an element of a countable set of propositional variables P. Given
any formula ϕ, we write SF(ϕ) for the set of subformulas of ϕ and |ϕ| for the
cardinality of SF(ϕ).
A dynamic poset is a tuple (W,4, S), where W is a non-empty set of states,
4 is a partial order, and S is a function fromW toW that satisfies the following
(forward) confluence condition:
for all w, v ∈ W , if w 4 v then S(w) 4 S(v). (1)
An intuitionistic dynamic model, or simply a model, is a tupleM = (W,4, S, V )
consisting of a dynamic poset equipped with a valuation function V from W to
sets of propositional variables satifying the monotonicity condition:
for all w, v ∈W , if w 4 v then V (w) ⊆ V (v). (2)
In the standard way, we define S0(w) = w and, for all k > 0, Sk(w) =
S
(
Sk−1(w)
)
. Then we define the satisfaction relation |= inductively by:
M, w  p iff p ∈ V (w)
M, w  ϕ iff M, S(w)  ϕ
M, w  ⊥ never
M, w  ♦ϕ iff ∃k s.t. M, Sk(w)  ϕ
M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w  ϕ and M, w  ψ
M, w  ϕ iff ∀k, M, Sk(w)  ϕ
M, w  ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w  ϕ or M, w  ψ
M, w  ϕ→ ψ iff ∀v < w, if M, v  ϕ then M, v  ψ
Given a model M = (W,4, S, V ), a set Σ of formulas, and w ∈ W , we write
ΣM(w) for the set {ψ ∈ Σ | M, w  ψ}; the subscript ‘M’ is omitted when it
is clear from the context. An eventuality in M is a pair (w,ϕ), where w ∈ W
and ϕ is a formula such that either ϕ = ♦ψ for some formula ψ and M, w  ϕ,
or ϕ = ψ for some formula ψ andM, w 2 ϕ. The fulfillment of an eventuality
(w,ϕ) is the finite sequence v0 . . . vn of states of the model such that 1. for all
k ≤ n, v0 = Sk(w), 2. if ϕ = ♦ψ then M, vn  ψ and for all k < n, M, vk 2 ψ,
and 3. if ϕ = ψ then M, vn 2 ψ and for all k < n, M, vk  ψ.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable over a class Ω of models if there is a modelM ∈ Ω
and a world w so that M, w  ϕ, and valid over Ω if, for every world w of
every model M ∈ Ω, M, w  ϕ. Satisfiability (resp. validity) over the class
of all intuitionisitic dynamic models is called satisfiability (resp. validity) for
the expanding domain intuitionisitic temporal logic ITLe. We will justify this
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terminology in the next section. First, we remark that dynamic posets impose
the minimal conditions on S and 4 in order to preserve the upwards-closure of
valuations of formulas. Below, we will use the notation JϕK = {w ∈ W | M, w 
ϕ}.
Proposition 1. Let D = (W,4, S), where (W,4) is a poset and S : W → W
is any function. Then, the following are equivalent:
1. S satisfies the confluence property (1);
2. for every valuation V on W and every formula ϕ, JϕK is upwards-closed
under 4.
Proof. That 1 implies 2 follows by a standard structural induction on ϕ. The
case where ϕ ∈ P follows from the condition on V and most inductive steps are
routine. Consider the case where ϕ = ψ, and suppose that w 4 v and w ∈ JϕK.
Then, for all i ∈ N,M, Si(w)  ψ. Since S is confluent, an easy induction shows
that, for all i ∈ N, Si(w) 4 Si(v). Therefore, from the induction hypothesis we
obtain that M, Si(v)  ψ for all i, hence v ∈ JϕK. Other cases are similar or
easier.
Now we prove that 2 implies 1 by contrapositive. Suppose that (W,4, S)
does not satisfy (1), so that there are w 4 v such that S(w) 64 S(v). Choose
p ∈ P and define V (u) = {p} if w 4 u, V (u) = ∅ otherwise. It is easy to see
that V satisfies the monotonicity condition (2). But, p 6∈ V (v), from which it
follows that (D, V ), w  p but (D, V ), v 2 p.
We are concerned with the satisfiability and validity problems for ITLe. Ob-
serve that satisfiability in propositional intuitionistic logic is equivalent to satis-
fiability in classical propositional logic. This is because, if ϕ is classically satisfi-
able, it is trivially intuitionistically satisfiable in a one-world model; conversely,
if ϕ is intuitionistically satisfiable, it is satisfiable in a finite model, hence in a
maximal world of that finite model, and the generated submodel of a maximal
world is a classical model. Thus it may be surprising that the same is not the
case for intuitionistic temporal logic:
Lemma 2. Any formula ϕ of the temporal language that is classically satisfiable
is satisfiable in a dynamic poset. However, there is a formula satisfiable on a
dynamic poset that is not classically satisfiable.
Proof. If ϕ is satisfied on a classical model M, then we may regard M as an
intuitionistic model by letting 4 be the identity. On the other hand, consider the
formula ¬ p∧¬ ¬p. Classically, this formula is equivalent to ¬ p∧ p, and
hence unsatisfiable. Define a model M = (W,4, S, V ), where W = {w, v, u},
x 4 y if x = y or x = v, y = u, S(w) = v and S(x) = x otherwise, and
V (u) = {p}. Then, one can check that M, w  ¬ p ∧ ¬ ¬p.
Hence the decidability of the intuitionistic satisfiability problem is not a
corollary of the classical case. In Section 5, we will prove that both the satisfia-
bility and the validity problems are decidable.
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3 Expanding and persistent frames
In this section, we discuss expanding and persistent models, and compare them
to dynamic models as we have defined above.
3.1 Expanding model property
The logic ITLe is closely related to expanding products of modal logics [13]. In
this subsection, we introduce stratified and expanding frames, and show that
satisfiability and validity on arbitrary models is equivalent to satisfiability and
validity on expanding models. To do this, it is convenient to represent posets
using acyclic graphs.
Definition 3. A directed acyclic graph is a tuple (W, ↑), where W is a set of
vertices, ↑ ⊆ W ×W is a set of edges whose reflexive, transitive closure ↑∗ is
antisymmetric. We will tacitly identify (W, ↑) with the poset (W, ↑∗). A path
from w1 to w2 is a finite sequence v0 . . . vn ∈ W such that v0 = w1, vn = w2
and for all k < n, vk ↑ vk+1. A tree is an acyclic graph (W, ↑) with an element
r ∈ W , called the root, such that for all w ∈ W there is a unique path from r
to w. A poset (W,4) is also a tree if there is a relation ↑ on W ×W such that
(W, ↑) is a tree and 4 = ↑∗.
Definition 4. A model M = (W,4, S, V ) is stratified if there is a partition
{Wn}n<ω of W such that 1. each Wn is closed under 4, 2. for all n, there
is relation ↑n such that (Wn,4⇂Wn) is a labeled tree, and 3. if w ∈ Wn
then S(w) ∈ Wn+1. If M is stratified, we write 4n, Sn, and Vn instead of
4⇂Wn , S⇂Wn , and V ⇂Wn and write Mn = (Wn,4n, Vn). If moreover we have
that S(w) 4 S(v) implies w 4 v, then we say that M is an expanding model.
Given a finite, non-empty set of formulas Σ closed under subformulas, a
model M = (W,4, S, V ), and a state w ∈ W , we will construct a stratified
model Me = (W e,4e, Se, V e) such that for the root we of W e0 , Σ(w
e) = Σ(w).
To this end, we first define the set D = N×N× 2Σ of possible defects. Since Σ
is finite and not empty, we assume that D is ordered such that for each k ∈ N,
the kth element (x, y, S) of D is such that x ≤ k. Then, for each k ∈ N, we
construct inductively a tuple (Uk, ↑k, hk) where Uk ⊆ N×N, ↑k ⊆ Uk ×Uk and
hk : Uk −→ W . The model Me is defined from all these tuples and the whole
construction proceeds as follows:
Base case. Let U0 = {0}×N, ↑0= ∅ and h0 be such that for all (0, y) ∈ U0,
h0(0, y) = S
y (w).
Inductive case. Let k > 0 and suppose that (Uk, ↑k, hk) has already
been constructed. Let (x, y, S) be the kth element of D. If (D1) (x, y) ∈ Uk,
(D2) Σ(hk(x, y)) 6= S, and (D3) there is v ∈ W such that hk(x, y) 4 v and
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Σ(v) = S, then we construct (Uk+1, ↑k+1, hk+1) such that:
Uk+1 = Uk ∪ {(c, d) ∈ N× N | c = k + 1 and d ≥ y}
↑k+1 = ↑k ∪ {((a, b), (c, d)) | a = x, c = k + 1, d ≥ y and b = d}
hk+1 = hk ∪
{
((c, d), w)
∣∣ c = k + 1, d ≥ y and w = Sd−y(v)}
Otherwise (Uk+1, ↑k+1, hk+1) = (Uk, ↑k, hk).
Final step. We constructMe = (W e,4e, Se, V e) such thatW e =
⋃
k∈N Uk,
4e = (↑e)∗, where ↑e =
⋃
k∈N ↑k,
Se = {((a, b), (c, d)) ∈W e ×W e | a = c and d = b+ 1} ,
and V e(x, y) = V (hx(x, y)) .
Lemma 5. For all (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ W e, if (x, y) 4e (x′, y′), then x ≤ x′, y = y′
and hx(x, y) 4 hx′(x′, y′).
Proof. Suppose that (x, y) 4e (x′, y′). There is a sequence (x0, y0) . . . (xn, yn)
such that (x0, y0) = (x, y), (xn, yn) = (x
′, y′) and for all i < n, (xi, yi) ↑
e
(xi+1, yi+1). By construction, for all i < n, (xi, yi) ↑xi+1 (xi+1, yi+1) and
yi = yi+1. Let (x
′′
i+1, y
′′
i+1, S
′′
i+1) be the (xi+1−1)
th element of D and v′′i+1 the el-
ement ofW choosen at the (xi+1−1)th step. By construction, x′′i+1 = xi, y
′′
i+1 ≤
yi and by the ordering of D, xi ≤ xi+1−1. Moreover, hxi(x, y
′′
i+1) 4 v
′′
i+1. Since
hxi(xi, yi) = S
yi−y
′′
i+1
(
hxi
(
xi, y
′′
i+1
))
and hxi+1(xi+1, yi+1) = S
yi+1−y
′′
i+1
(
v′′i+1
)
,
by the confluence condition for M, hxi(xi, yi) 4 hxi+1(xi+1, yi+1).
Lemma 6. Me is an expanding model.
Proof. First we check that Me is stratified. By Lemma 5, 4e is antisymetric,
hence a partial order. For the monotonicity condition, suppose that (x, y) 4e
(x′, y′). By Lemma 5, hx(x, y) 4 hx′(x′, y′) and by the monotonicity condition
for M, V (hx(x, y)) ⊆ V (hx′(x
′, y′)). For the confluence condition, it suffices
to observe that by construction, if (x, y) ↑e (x′, y′) then (x, y + 1) ↑e (x′, y′ +
1). Therefore, Me is a model. To prove that Me is stratified, define W en =
{(x, y) ∈W e | y = n} for all n ∈ N. Conditions 3 of Def. 4 trivially holds and
condition 1 comes directly from Lemma 5. To prove condition 2, it suffices to
observe that by construction, for all (x, y) ∈W e, either x = 0 or there is exactly
one state (x′, y′) ∈ W e such that (x′, y′) ↑e (x, y). Therefore, by Lemma 5, for
all (x, y) ∈ W e, there is a unique path from (0, y) to (x, y). Finally, to prove
thatMe is expanding, suppose that (c, b) ∈W e and (a, b+1) ↑e (c, b+1). Then
the (c− 1)th element of D is (a, y, S) for some y, S. Moreover, since (c, b) ∈ W e,
b ≥ y and since (x, y) ∈ W e, (a, b) ∈ W e and (a, b) ↑e (c, b). Therefore it can
easily be proved by induction on the length of the path from Se(w) to Se(v)
that Se(w) 4e Se(v) implies w 4e v.
Lemma 7. For any state (x, y) ∈ W e and any ψ ∈ Σ, Me, (x, y)  ψ if and
only if M, hx(x, y)  ψ.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the size |ψ| of the formula. The cases for
propositional variables, falsum, conjunctions and disjunctions are straightfor-
ward. For the temporal modalities, it suffices to observe that for all (x, y) ∈W e
and all n ∈ N, (x, y + n) ∈ W e and hx(x, y + n) = Sn (hx(x, y)). Finally, for
implication, suppose first thatMe, (x, y) 2 ψ1 → ψ2. Then there is (x
′, y′) such
that (x, y) 4e (x′, y′), Me, (x′, y′)  ψ1 and Me, (x′, y′) 2 ψ2. By Lemma 5,
hx(x, y) 4 hx′(x′, y′) and by induction hypothesis, M, hx′(x′, y′)  ψ1 and
M, hx′(x′, y′) 2 ψ2. Therefore, M, hx(x, y) 2 ψ1 → ψ2. For the other direction
suppose that M, hx(x, y) 2 ψ1 → ψ2. There is v′ ∈ W such that hx(x, y) 4 v′,
M, v′  ψ1 and M, v′ 2 ψ2. Let k be such that (x, y,Σ(v′)) is the kth element
of D. Condition (D3) trivially holds and since x ≤ k, condition (D1) holds
too. Hence, there is (x′, y′) ∈ W e such that Σ(hx′(x′, y′)) = Σ(v′) and either
(x′, y′) = (x, y) or (x′, y′) ↑e (x, y). By induction hypothesis, Me, (x′, y′)  ψ1
and Me, (x′, y′) 2 ψ2, hence Me, (x, y) 2 ψ1 → ψ2.
In conclusion, we obtain the following:
Theorem 8. A formula ϕ is satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) on an intuitionistic
dynamic model if and only if it is satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) on an expanding
model.
3.2 Persistent frames
Expanding models were introduced as a weakening of product models. They
often lead to logics with a less complex validity problem. Thus it is natural
to also consider a variant of ITLe interpreted over product models, or over the
somewhat wider class of persistent models.
Definition 9. Let (W,4) be a poset. If S : W →W is such that, whenever v <
S(w), there is u < w such that v = S(u), we say that S is backward confluent.
If S is both forward and backward confluent, we say that it is persistent. A tuple
(W,4, S) where S is persistent is a persistent intuitionistic temporal frame, and
the set of valid formulas over the class of persistent intuitionistic temporal frames
is denoted ITLp, or persistent domain LTL.
The name ‘persistent’ comes from the fact that Theorem 8 can be modified
to obtain a stratified model M′ where S′ : W ′k → W
′
k+1 is an isomorphism,
i.e. whose domains are persistent with respect to S′. As we will see, the finite
model property fails over the class of persistent models.
Lemma 10. The formula ϕ = ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p is not valid over the class of
persistent models.
Proof. Consider the modelM = (W,4, S, V ), whereW = Z∪{r} with r a fresh
world not in Z, w 4 v if and only if w = r or w = v, S(r) = r and S(n) = n+ 1
for n ∈ Z, and JpK = [0,∞). It is readily seen that M is a persistent model,
that M, r  ¬¬♦p (since every maximal world above r satisfies ♦p), yet
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M, r 2 ♦¬¬p, since there is no n such that M, Sn(r)  ¬¬p. It follows that
M, r 2 ϕ, and hence ϕ is not valid, as claimed.
Lemma 11. The formula ϕ (from Lemma 10) is valid over the class of finite,
persistent models.
Proof. Let M = (W,4, S, V ) be a finite, persistent model, and assume that
M, w  ¬¬♦p. Let v1, . . . , vn enumerate the maximal elements of {v ∈ W |
w 4 v}. For each i ≤ n, let ki be large enough so that M, Ski(vi)  p, and
let k = max ki. We claim that M, Sk(w)  ¬¬p, which concludes the proof.
Let u < Sk(w) be any leaf. Then, there is vi < w such that u = Sk(vi) (since
compositions of persistent functions are persistent). But, since k ≥ ki, we obtain
M, u  p, as desired.
The following is then immediate from Lemmas 10 and 11:
Theorem 12. ITLp does not have the finite model property.
Thus our decidability proof for ITLe, which proceeds by first establishing
a strong finite model property, does not carry over to ITLp. Whether ITLp is
decidable remains open.
4 Combinatorics of intuitionistic models
In this section we introduce some combinatorial tools we will need in order to
prove that ITLe has the strong finite model property, and hence is decidable.
We begin by discussing labeled structures, which allow for a graph-theoretic
approach to intuitionistic models.
4.1 Labeled structures and quasimodels
Definition 13. Given a set Λ whose elements we call ‘labels’ and a set W , a
Λ-labeling function on W is any function λ : W → Λ. A structure S = (W,R, λ)
where W is a set, R ⊆W ×W and λ is a labeling function on W is a Λ-labeled
structure, where ‘structure’ may be replaced with ‘poset’, ‘directed graph’, etc.
A useful measure of the complexity of a labeled poset is given by its level:
Definition 14. Given a labeled poset A = (W,4, λ) and an element w ∈ W ,
an increasing chain from w of length n is a sequence v1 . . . vn of elements of
W such that v1 = w and ∀i < n, vi ≺ vi+1, where u ≺ u′ is shorthand for
u 4 u′ and u′ 64 u. The chain v1 . . . vn is proper if it moreover satisfies ∀i <
n, λ (vi) 6= λ (vi+1) . The depth dpt(w) ∈ N ∪ {ω} of w is defined such that
dpt(w) = m if m is the maximal length of all the increasing chains from w and
lvl(w) = ω is there is no such maximum. Similarly, the level lvl(w) ∈ N ∪ {ω}
of w is defined such that lvl(w) = m if m is the maximal length of all the proper
increasing chains from w and lvl(w) = ω if there is no such maximum. The
level lvl(A) of A is the maximal level of all its elements.
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An important class of labeled posets comes from intuitionistic models.
Definition 15. Given an intuitionistic Kripke model M = (W,4, V ) and a set
Σ of intuitionistic formulas closed under subformulas, it can easily be checked
that for all w, v ∈ W , if w 4 v then Σ(w) ⊆ Σ(v). We denote the labeled poset
(W,4,Σ(·)) by MΣ. Conversely, given a labeled poset A = (W,4, λ) over 2Σ,
the valuation Vλ is defined such that Vλ(w) = {p ∈ P | p ∈ λ(w)} for all w ∈W ,
and denote the resulting model by Amod.
Definition 16. Let Σ be a finite set of formulas closed under subformulas and
A = (W,4, λ) be a 2Σ-labeled poset. We say that A is a Σ-quasimodel if λ
is monotone in the sense that w 4 v implies that λ(w) ⊆ λ(v), and whenever
ϕ → ψ ∈ Σ and w ∈ W , we have that ϕ → ψ ∈ λ(w) if and only if, for all v
such that w 4 v, if ϕ ∈ λ(v) then ψ ∈ λ(v).
4.2 Simulations, immersions and condensations
As is well-known, truth in intuitionistic models is preserved by bisimulation,
and thus this is usually the appropriate notion of equivalence between different
models. However, for our purposes, it is more convenient to consider a weaker
notion, which we call bimersion.
Definition 17. Given two labeled posets A = (WA,4A, λA) and B = (WB,4B
, λB) and a relation R ⊆WA ×WB, we write dom(R) for
{w ∈ WA | ∃v ∈WB, (w, v) ∈ R}
and rng(R) for {v ∈WB | ∃w ∈WA, (w, v) ∈ R}. A relation σ ⊆WA ×WB is
a simulation from A to B if dom(σ) = WA and whenever w σ v, it follows that
λA(w) = λB(v), and if w 4A w′ then there is v′ so that v 4B v′ and w′ σ v′.
A simulation is called an immersion if it is a function. If an immersion
σ : WA → WB exists, we write A E B. If, moreover, there is an immersion
τ : WB → WA, we say that they are bimersive, write A , B, and call the pair
(σ, τ) a bimersion. A condensation from A to B is a bimersion (ρ, ι) so that
ρ : WA → WB, ι : WB → WA, ρ is surjective, and ρι is the identity on WB. If
such a condensation exists we write B ≪ A. Observe that B ≪ A implies that
B , A.
If M,N are models and Σ a set of formulas closed under subformulas, we
write M EΣ N if MΣ E NΣ, and define ,Σ,≪Σ similarly. We may also write
e.g. A ≪M if A is 2Σ-labeled and A ≪MΣ.
It will typically be convenient to work with immersions rather than simula-
tions: however, as the next lemma shows, not much generality is lost by this
restriction.
Lemma 18. Let A = (WA,4A, λA) and B = (WB,4B, λB) be labeled posets. If
a simulation σ ⊆ WA ×WB exists, WA is a finite tree, and w σ w′, then there
is an immersion σ′ ⊆WA ×WB such that w ∈ dom(σ′).
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Proof. By a straightforward induction on the depth of w. Let D be the set of
daughters of w, and for each v ∈ D, choose v′ so that v σ v′ and w′ 4 v. By the
induction hypothesis, there is an immersion σ′v with v ∈ dom(σ
′
v). Then, one
readily checks that {(w,w′)} ∪
⋃
v∈D σ
′
v is also an immersion, as needed.
Condensations are useful for producing (small) quasimodels out of models.
Proposition 19. Given an intuitionistic dynamic modelM = (WM,4M, VM),
a set Σ of intuitionistic formulas that is closed for subformulas, and a 2Σ-labeled
poset A = (WA,4A, λA) over Σ, if A ≪M, then A is a quasimodel.
Proof. Let (ρ, ι) be a condensation from MΣ to A. If w 4A v, then ι(w) 4M
ι(v), so that λ(w) = Σ(ι(w)) ⊆ Σ(ι(v)) = λ(v). Next, suppose that ϕ → ψ ∈
λ(w), and consider v such that w 4A v. Then, M, ι(w)  ϕ→ ψ. Since ι is an
immersion, ι(w) 4M ι(v), hence if M, ι(v)  ϕ, then also M, ι(v)  ψ. Thus if
ϕ ∈ λA(v), it follows that ψ ∈ λA(v). Finally, suppose that ϕ→ ψ ∈ Σ \ λ(w).
Then,M, ι(w) 2 ϕ→ ψ, so that there is v ∈ WA such that ι(w) 4A v,M, v  ϕ
and M, v 2 ψ. It follows that ϕ ∈ λ(ρ(v)) and ψ 6∈ λ(ρ(v)), and since ρ is an
immersion we also have that w = ρι(w) 4 ρ(v), as needed.
4.3 Normalized labeled trees
In order to count the number of different labeled trees up to bimersion, we
construct, for any set Λ of labels and any k ≥ 1, the labeled directed acyclic
graph GΛk =
(
WΛk , ↑
Λ
k , λ
Λ
k
)
by induction on k as follows.
Base case. For k = 1, let GΛ1 =
(
WΛ1 , ↑
Λ
1 , λ
Λ
1
)
with WΛ1 = L, ↑
Λ
1= ∅, and
λΛ1 (w) = w for all w ∈ W
Λ
1 .
Inductive case. Suppose that GΛk =
(
WΛk , ↑
Λ
k , λ
Λ
k
)
has already been de-
fined.The graph GΛk+1 =
(
WΛk+1, ↑
Λ
k+1, λ
Λ
k+1
)
is constructed such that:
WΛk+1 =W
Λ
k ∪ P
↑Λk+1 =↑
Λ
k ∪
{
(x, y) ∈WΛk+1 ×W
Λ
k+1
∣∣ ∃(ℓ, S) ∈ P, x ∈ S and y = (ℓ, S)}
λΛk+1(w) =
{
λΛk (w) if w ∈ W
Λ
k
ℓ if w = (ℓ, S) ∈ P
where P =
{
(ℓ, S) ∈ L× P
(
WΛk
) ∣∣ ∀y ∈ S, λΛk (y) 6= ℓ}.
Note that GΛk =
(
WΛk , ↑
Λ
k , λ
Λ
k
)
is typically not a tree, but we may unravel it
to obtain one.
Definition 20. Given a labeled directed acyclic graph G = (W, ↑, λ) and a node
w ∈ W , the unraveling of G from w is the labeled tree Tw = (Ww , ↑w, λw) such
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that Ww is the set of all the paths from w in G, ξ ↑w ζ if and only if there is
v ∈W such that ζ = ξv, and λw(v0 . . . vn) = λ(vn).
Proposition 21. For any rooted labeled tree T = (W, ↑, λ) over a set Λ of labels,
if the level of T is finite then there is a condensation from T to an unraveling
of ĜΛ
lvl(T ).
Proof. Let T = (W, ↑, λ) be a labeled directed acyclic graph with root r. We
write ≺ for the transitive closure of ↑ and 4 for the reflexive closure of ≺. The
proof is by induction on the level n = lvl(T ) of T . For n = 1, observe that this
means that λ(w) = λ(r) for all w ∈W . Let ρ = W ×{λ(r)} and ι = {(λ(r), r)}.
It can easily be checked that (ρ, ι) is a condensation. For n > 1, suppose the
property holds for all rooted labeled trees T ′ such that lvl(T )′ < n. Define the
following sets:
N = {w ∈ W | λ(w) 6= λ(r) and for all v ≺ w, λ(v) = λ(r)}
S = {w ∈ W | for all v 4 w, λ(v) = λ(r)}
Clearly, for all w ∈ N , lvl(w) < n. Therefore, by induction, there is a con-
densation (ρw, ιw) from the subgraph of T generated by w to the unravel-
ing of GΛn−1 from some yw ∈ W
Λ
n−1. Let us define r
′ = (λ(r), {yw | w ∈ N})
and consider the unraveling G of GΛn from r
′. It can easily be checked that
ρ = (S × {r′})∪
⋃
w∈W ρw is an immersion from T to G, ι
′ = {(r′, r)}∪
⋃
w∈W ιw
is a simulation from G to T and ι′ ⊆ ρ−1. Using Lemma 18, we can then choose
an immersion ι ⊆ ι′, so that (ρ, ι) is a condensation from T to G.
Finally, let us define recursively Enk and Q
n
k for all n, k ∈ N by:
Enk =
{
0 if k = 0
Enk−1 + n2
En
k−1 otherwise
Qnk =
{
0 if k = 0
1 + Enk−1Q
n
k−1 otherwise
The following lemma can be proven by a straightforward induction, left to
the reader.
Lemma 22. For any finite set Λ with cardinality n and all k ∈ N, 1. the
cardinality of GΛk is bounded by E
n
k , and 2. the cardinality of any unraveling of
GΛk is bounded by Q
n
k .
From these and Proposition 21, we obtain the following:
Theorem 23. 1. Given a set of labels Λ and a Λ-labeled tree T of level
k < ω, there is T ′ , T bounded by Q
|Λ|
k . We call T
′ the normalized
Λ-labeled tree for T .
2. Given a sequence of Λ-labeled trees T1, . . . , Tn of level k < ω with n > E
|Λ|
k ,
there are indexes i < j ≤ n such that Ti , Tj.
The second item may be viewed as a finitary variant of Kruskal’s theorem
for labeled trees [19]. When applied to quasimodels, we obtain the following:
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Proposition 24. Let Σ be a set of formulas closed under subformulas with
|Σ| = s < ω.
1. Given a tree-like Σ-quasimodel T and a formula ϕ, there is a tree-like
Σ-quasimodel T ′ ,Σ T bounded by Q2
s
s+1. We call T
′ the normalized
Σ-quasimodel for T .
2. Given a sequence of tree-like Σ-quasimodels T1, . . . , Tn with n > E
2s
s+1,
there are indexes i < j ≤ n such that Ti , Tj.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 19 and Lemma 22 using the fact that any
Σ-quasimodel has level at most s+ 1.
Finally, we obtain an analogous result for pointed structures.
Definition 25. A pointed labeled poset is a structure (W,4, λ, w) consisting
of a labeled tree with a designated world w ∈ W . Given a labeled poset A =
(WA,4A, λA) and w ∈WA, we denfine a pointed, labeled poset Aw = (WA,4A
, λA, w). A pointed simulation between pointed labeled posets A = (WA,4A
, λA, wA) and B = (WB,4B, λB, wB) is a simulation σ ⊂WA ×WB such that if
w σ v, then w = wA if and only if v = wB. The notions of pointed immersion,
pointed condensation, etc. are defined analogously to Definition 17.
Lemma 26. If Λ has n elements, any pointed Λ-labeled poset of level at most
k condenses to a labeled pointed tree bounded by Q2nk+2, and there are at most
E2nk+2 bimersion classes.
Proof. We may view a pointed labeled poset A = (W,4, λ, w) as a (non-pointed)
labeled poset as follows. Let Λ′ = Λ×{0, 1}. Then, set λ′(v) = (λ(v), 0) if v 6= w,
λ′(w) = (λ(w), 1). Note that A may now have level k + 2, since we may have
that u 4 w 4 v, λ(u) = λ(w) = λ(v), yet λ′(u) 6= λ′(w) and λ′(w) 6= λ′(v). By
Proposition 21, A condenses to a generated tree T of GΛ
′
k+2 by some condensation
(ρ, ι). Let w′ = ρ(w), and consider T as a pointed structure with distinguished
point w′. Given that ρ is a surjective, label-preserving function, w,w′ are the
only points whose label has second component 1, and therefore (ρ, ι) must be a
pointed condensation, as claimed.
Proposition 27. Let Σ be a set of formulas closed under subformulas with
|Σ| = s < ω.
1. Given a tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodel T and a formula ϕ, there is a
tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodel T ′ , T bounded by Q2
s+1
s+3 . We call T
′ the
normalized pointed Σ-quasimodel for T .
2. Given a sequence of tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodels T1, . . . , Tn with n >
E2
s+1
s+3 , there are indexes i < j ≤ n such that Ti , Tj .
With these tools at hand, we are ready to prove that ITLe has the strong
finite model property, and hence is decidable.
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5 Decidability
The following transformations are defined for any stratified model M and any
finite, non-empty set of formulas Σ closed under subformulas. In each case, given
a stratified model M = (W,4, S, V ), we will produce another stratified model
M′ = (W ′,4′, S′, V ′) and a map π : W ′ → W such that ΣM(w) = ΣM′(π(w))
for all w ∈W ′.
Replace Mk with a copy of the normalized Σ-quasimodel of Mk.
Let T = (WT , ↑T , λT ) be a copy of the normalized labeled tree of M
Σ
k such
that WT ∩W = ∅, and (ρ, ι) the condensation from MΣk to T . The result of
the transformation is the tuple (W ′,4′, S′, V ′) such that W ′ = W ∪WT \Wk,
4′= 4⇂W\Wk ∪ (↑T )
∗,
S′(w) =

ρ (S (w)) if S(w) ∈Wk
S (ι (w)) if w ∈ WT
S(w) otherwise
V ′(w) =
{
{p | p ∈ λT (w)} if w ∈ WT
V (w) otherwise
The map π is the identity on W ′i =Wi for i 6= k, and π(w) = ι(w) for w ∈W
′
k.
Replace Mk with a copy of the normalized, pointed Σ-quasimodel
of Mk preserving w, where w ∈ Wk. The transformation is similar to the
previous one except that Mk is regarded as a pointed structure with distin-
guished point w.
Replace Mℓ with Mk, where k < ℓ and there is an immersion σ : Wk →
Wℓ (seen as 2
Σ-labeled trees). The result of the transformation is the tuple
(W ′,4′, S′, V ′) such that W ′ =W \
⋃
k<m≤ℓWm, 4
′= 4⇂W ′ ,
S′(w) =
{
S (σ (w)) if S(w) ∈Wk
S(w) otherwise
and V ′ = V ⇂W ′ .
The map π is the identity on W ′i =Wi for i < k, on W
′
i =Wi+ℓ−k for i > k,
and π(w) = σ(w) for all w ∈W ′k.
Replace Mℓ with Mk connecting wk to wℓ, where k < ℓ, wk ∈ Wk,
wℓ ∈ Wℓ and there is an immersion σ : Wk → Wℓ such that σ(wk) = wℓ. The
transformation is defined as the previous one.
Lemma 28. The result of any previous transformation is a stratified model
such that ΣM(w) = ΣM′(π(w)) for any w ∈W ′.
Proof. The proof that M′ = (W ′,4′, S′, V ′) is a model is straighforward and
left to the reader. We prove by structural induction on ϕ that for all trans-
formations, all w ∈ W ′ and all ϕ ∈ Σ, M′, w  ϕ iff M, π(w)  ϕ. We only
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detail the case for the next modality when Mk is replaced with a copy of the
normalized Σ-quasimodel T of Mk and w ∈ W ′k−1. The cases for the other
temporal modalities are similar (see also the proof of Lemma 29). The cases
for the implication are similar as in the proof of Proposition 19. The remaining
cases are straighforward. Suppose that w ∈ W ′k−1 and M, π(w)  ψ. Then
ψ ∈ Σ(S(w)). Since S′(w) = ρ(S(w)), π(S′(w)) = ι(S′(w)) and (ρ, ι) is a
condensation, Σ(S(w)) = λT (S
′(w)) = Σ(π(S′(w))) and M, π(S′(w))  ϕ. By
induction hypothesis, M′, S′(w)  ϕ, hence M′, w  ϕ. The other direction
is similar.
Now, let us consider a stratified modelM = (W,4, S, V ) with w0 the root of
W0. The finite model Mfin =
(
W fin,4fin, Sfin, V fin
)
with a state wfin0 such that
Σ(wfin0 ) = Σ(w0) is constructed by the following procedure. This procedure is in
three phases plus a final step. At each step, the current modelM = (W,4, S, V ),
initialized to M, is modified. Moreover, three index variables are maintained
by the procedure:
• The variable i, initialized to 0, indicates the current labeled treesWi which
is considered.
• The variable j, initialy undefined, indicates the index of the first labeled
trees occuring infinitely often up to bimersion.
• The variable ℓ, initialy undefined, holds the index of the last labeled tree
that must not be modified.
As an invariant, M is stratified until the final step and for all k < i, Mk is a
copy of a normalized labeled tree.
First phase.
• If there is k < i such that Mk EMi, replace Mi with Mk, set i to k + 1
and redo the same phase.
• If not, and for all x > i there is y > x such that My EMi, then replace
Mi with a copy of its normalized Σ-quasimodel, increase i by one, set j
and ℓ to i and start the next phase.
• Otherwise, replace Mi with its normalized Σ-quasimodel, increase i by
one and redo the same phase.
Second phase. In this phase, we need to care about eventualities. To this
end, a current eventuality (w,ψ), initialy undefined, is maintained across the
executions of the phase. Let wx denote the element of the fulfillment of (w,ψ)
belonging to Wx (if it exists), and M+x be the pointed structure M
wx
x . The
phase proceeds through the following steps:
• If (w,ψ) is defined and the last element of the fulfillment of (w,ψ) belongs
to some Wk with k ≤ i then undefine (w,ψ), set ℓ to i and repeat the
same phase.
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• If (w,ψ) is undefined then choose an eventuality (w,ψ) such that w ∈ Wj
and the last element of its fulfillment belongs to some Wk with k > i. If
there is no such eventuality then start the next phase.
• If (w,ψ) is defined and there is k such that ℓ < k < i and M+k E M
+
i ,
then replace Mi with Mk connecting wk to wi, set i to k + 1 and redo
the same phase.
• Otherwise, replace Mi with a copy of the normalized labeled tree of Mk
preserving wi, increase i and redo the same phase.
Third phase.
• If Mi EMj , then start the final step.
• If there is k such that ℓ < k < i and Mk E Mi, then replace Mi with
Mk, set i to k + 1 and redo the same phase.
• Otherwise, replace Mi with a copy of its normalized Σ-quasimodel, in-
crease i by one and redo the same phase.
Final step. There is an immersion σ : Wi →Wj . Construct the final tuple
(W fin,4fin, Sfin, V fin) such that W fin =
⋃
0≤m<iWm, 4
fin= 4⇂W fin ,
Sfin(w) =
{
σ (S (w)) if w ∈ Wi−1
S(w) otherwise
V fin = V ⇂W fin , and w
fin
0 is the root of W0 (note that w
fin
0 ∈W
fin).
Lemma 29. The final tuple is a model and Σ(wfin0 ) = Σ(w0).
Proof. The proof that Mfin =
(
W fin,4fin, Sfin, V fin
)
is a model is straightfor-
ward and left to the reader. We prove by structural induction on ϕ that for
all w ∈ W fin and all ϕ ∈ Σ, Mfin, w  ϕ iff M, w  ϕ. The cases for propo-
sitional variables and the boolean connectives are straightforward. The case
for the next temporal modality is similar as in the proof of Lemma 28. For
the eventually and henceforth temporal modalities, suppose first that (w,ϕ) is
an eventuality in M and w ∈ W fin. Let w0 . . . wn be the fulfillment of (w,ϕ)
in M. If wn ∈ W
fin then by induction hypothesis, (w,ϕ) is an eventuality in
Mfin. Otherwise, there is k ≤ n such that wk ∈ Wi. Therefore, (wk, ϕ) is an
eventuality in M and so is (σ(wk), ϕ). Since by construction, after the second
phase, the length of the fulfillment of any eventuality (v, ϕ) such that v ∈ Wj
is bounded by 1 + i − j, (w,ϕ) is an eventuality in Mfin. Conversely, suppose
now that (w,ϕ) is an eventuality in Mfin and let w0 . . . wn be its fulfillment.
For each k ≤ n let mk be such that wk ∈ Wmk . The proof is by a subinduction
on the number r of k ∈ 1 . . n such that mk = j. If r = 0 then by induction
hypothesis, (w,ϕ) is is an eventuality inM. If r > 0, let k > 0 be the least index
such that mk = j. If k = n then suppose that ϕ = ♦ψ, the other case beeing
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symmetric. When haveMfin, wk  ψ and by inductionM, wk  ψ. Since k > 0,
wk = S
fin(wk−1) = σ(S(wk−1)) and since σ is an immersion, M, S(wk−1)  ψ.
Therefore (w,ϕ) is an eventuality in M. Finally, if r > 0 and k < n then
(wk, ϕ) is an eventuality in Mfin and by the subinduction hypothesis (wk, ϕ) is
an eventuality in M. Since k > 0, wk = S
fin(wk−1) = σ(S(wk−1)). Morevoer,
since σ is an immersion, (S(wk−1), ϕ) is an eventuality in M. Hence (w,ϕ) is
an eventuality in M.
Lemma 30. The cardinality of W fin is bounded by
B(s)
def
= Q2
s+1
s+3
(
2E2
s
s+1 + sQ
2s
s+1E
2s+1
s+3
)
where s = |Σ|.
Proof. Let us consider the stratified modelM = (W,4, S, V ) obtained after the
third phase. For all k < i, Wk is a copy either of a normalized Σ-quasimodel or
of a pointed normalized Σ-quasimodel. By Propositions 24 and 27, for all k < i,
|Wk| ≤ Q2
s+1
s+3 . We prove now that
i ≤ 2E2
s
s+1 + sQ
2s
s+1E
2s+1
s+3 .
After the first phase, by Proposition 24, we have j ≤ E2
s
s+1 and |Wj | ≤ Q
2s
s+1.
Therefore, during the second phase, the current eventuality is defined at most
sQ2
s
s+1 times. Moreover, each time the current eventuality is undefined, by
Proposition 27 we have that i − ℓ ≤ E2
n+1
n+3 . Therefore, when the second phase
terminates,
ℓ− j ≤ sQ2
s
s+1E
2s+1
s+3 .
Finally, after the third phase, by Proposition 24, i− ℓ ≤ E2
s
s+1.
We have proved the following strong finite model property.
Theorem 31. There exists a computable function B such that for any formula
ϕ ∈ L, if ϕ is satisfiable (resp. unsatisfiable) then ϕ is satisfiable (resp. falsifi-
able) in a model M = (W,4, S, V ) such that |W | ≤ B(|ϕ|).
Proof. In view of Theorem 8, a formula ϕ is satisfiable (resp. falsifiable) in a
model M if and only if it is satisfied (resp. falsified) at the root of a stratified
model Me. Then, by Lemma 29, ϕ is satisfied (resp. falsified) in Me if and
only if it is satisfied (res. falsified) on (Me)fin, which is effectively bounded by
B(|ϕ|) by Lemma 30.
As a corollary, we get the decidability of ITLe.
Corollary 32. The satisfiability and validity problems for ITLe are decidable.
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6 Conclusion
We have introduced ITLe, an intuitionistic analogue of LTL based on expand-
ing domain models from modal logic. In the literature, intuitionistic modal
logic is typically interpreted over persistent models, but as we have shown this
interpretation has the technical disadvantage of not enjoying the finite model
property. Of course, this fact alone does not imply that ITLp is undecidable, and
whether the latter is true remains an open problem. Meanwhile, our semantics
are natural in the sense that we impose the minimal conditions on S so that any
formula is true on an upwards-closed set under 4, and a wider class of models
is convenient as they can more easily be tailored for specific applications.
This is an exploratory work, being the first to consider the logic ITLe. As
can be gathered from the tools we have developed, understanding this logic
poses many technical challenges, and many interesting questions remain open.
Perhaps the most pressing is the complexity of validity and satisfiability: the
decision procedure we have given is non-elementary, but there seems to be little
reason to assume that this is optimal. It may be possible to further ‘trim’ the
modelMfin to obtain one that is elementarily bounded. However, we should not
expect polynomially bounded models, as ITLe is conservative over intuitionistic
propositional logic, which is already PSpace-complete. Finally, we leave open
the problem of finding a sound and complete axiomatization for ITLe.
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